Vajadzīgas strukturālas reformas

Intervija ar Vācijas Centrālās bankas prezidentu Jensu Veidmanu

Tāpat kā Vācija ir lielākā tautsaimniecība Eiropas Savienībā, Vācijas Bundesbank ir allaž bijusi ietekmīgākā centrālā banka eirozonā. Kopš finanšu krīzes sākuma Bundesbank ir kļuvusi par vienu no stingrākajiem pretiniekiem “naudas drukāšanai” kā atsevišķu valstu ekonomisko problēmu risinājumu. Tiesa, šī nostāja radījusi spriedzi Eiropas Centrālās bankas padomē. Pēdējā laikā vērotāji aizvien biežāk norāda uz atšķirīgiem uzsvariem Bundesbank prezidenta Jensa Veidmana (Jens Weidmann) un ECB prezidenta Mario Dragi (Mario Draghi) izteicienos un uz faktu, ka Dragi ir spējis ECB politiku virzīt uz aktīvāku intervenci ekonomikā nekā tas, šķiet, Bundesbank prezidentam būtu pa prātam.

Pagājušajā nedēļā Veidmans apmeklēja Rīgu, lai nolasītu lekciju Latvijas Bankas rīkotā konferencē. Šajā sakarā Ir bija iespēja rakstiski uzdot Veidmanam jautājumus. Ņemot vērā finanšu tirgu jūtīgumu pret vismazākajām niansēm centrālo banku vadītāju izteikumos, jautājumus un atbildes publicējam oriģinālvalodā.

There is a great deal of debate both in academia and among policymakers about the lessons to be learned from Latvia’s recent economic crisis and recovery. What are the main lessons you draw from this experience? Can they be applied to other countries as well?

The resolve the Latvian government has shown in securing membership of the euro area has been impressive. But with Latvia being a small, open economy, I would caution that Latvia’s lessons cannot be easily applied to other member states. The crisis has different origins in different member states. In some countries, high private indebtedness combined with sharply declining house prices are the most pressing problem, in other countries, it is excessive public debt, in others a lack of competitiveness, and in some a combination of all these problems. There is no “one size fits all” answer to the crisis, and this is one reason why the crisis is so protracted.

Worries about slow growth and the threat of deflation in the eurozone have analysts concerned about a long period of Japanese-style stagnation in Europe. In your opinion, how serious is this threat? What should be done to prevent such a scenario from taking place? France and Italy argue that slower growth means that countries should be allowed to run larger budget deficits. Do you agree?

There is consensus within the Governing Council that the risk of a problematic deflation is low. The Council is more concerned about a too prolonged period of low inflation, and we have taken substantial measures to address that risk. Some of these measures have not even gone into effect yet, and in any case, the measures now need time to work their way through the real economy. But let’s be clear: the risk of persistently low growth cannot be mitigated by monetary policy. It can only be tackled by removing the structural bottlenecks that hamper competition, innovation, and productivity. Growth-friendly consolidation is an important part of that – raising the retirement age, for instance, strengthens both the public purse and growth potential. With a view to the specific institutional set-up of the monetary union, it is important that fiscal rules are adhered to because the costs of an unsound policy can be partly shifted to other member states. Sound public finances are also crucial for the credibility of a stability-oriented monetary policy. And the programme countries that played by the rules resent, for good reason, larger countries being treated differently.

Since inflation in the eurozone is much lower than the ECB’s target of “below, but close to 2%”, what actions should the ECB take?

Again: first, there is no automatism between a momentary undershooting of the Governing Council’s definition of price stability, which is a medium-term target, and the need for monetary policy action. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the current low inflationary pressure is caused by the decline in energy prices and by the necessary adjustment processes in some euro-area countries. Second, the Eurosystem has already agreed on far-reaching, unprecedented measures to counter a long-lasting period of low inflation. The Governing Council has lowered its key interest rates to zero, it has started to launch a sequence of targeted long-term refinancing operations, and it has decided on two asset purchase programmes. So monetary policy is already very expansionary and some of the more recent monetary policy measures have not gone into full effect yet. If governments were to decide on further confidence-building structural reforms, the impetus of our monetary policy would certainly be strengthened. In the end, politics holds the key to overcoming the crisis.

The latest economic data from Germany indicate that the country is headed for an economic slowdown. How concerned are you about this possibility? What should Germany do to boost growth? In view of the apparently worsening growth prospects, should the German government stick to its goal of balancing the budget in 2015?

The latest data for Germany have been disappointing indeed. But its economy remains fundamentally strong and it is expected that Germany will grow in line with its potential this and next year. There is therefore no need for deficit-financed fiscal stimulus. Germany’s debt level is high and the country is facing a huge demographic burden that will weigh on growth and public finances. In that light, pursuing a balanced budget makes perfect sense. In the event that the economic situation deteriorates further, however, the automatic stabilisers – which are quite large in Germany – should be able to take effect.

There is a school of thought that Germany’s large current account surplus is in fact harmful for the country’s economy, because it is a sign that necessary investments are not being made in Germany itself. Do you agree? Should Germany be investing more in infrastructure and other public goods?

In light of an aging society, it makes sense for the Germany economy to invest part of its savings abroad. Hence, German surpluses are probably here to stay. But it is true that the current account surplus partly reflects weak investment activity in Germany. Private investments are encumbered by the high degree of uncertainty not least due to the weak economic situation in the euro area and due to the increasing geo-political risks.

Additionally, there is agreement in Germany that public investment should be strengthened. No consensus exists, however, about the size of the gap. In this regard, it is important to judge investment on a case-by-case basis because in the past not all public investment measures have been money well spent. The additional public investment measures should be financed by shifting priorities away from public consumption towards investment, not by taking on additional debt. From a European perspective, neither more public investment nor deficit spending in Germany would probably come with very significant spill-overs to the crisis countries.

There seems to have been a strong connection between ECB President Mario Draghi’s announcement in July 2012 that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to prevent the breakup of the eurozone and the subsequent significant fall in the bond spreads of the countries in crisis at the time. Some analysts see this as proof that the ECB should actively take on the role of “lender of last resort” in the eurozone to prevent the kind of crisis that we experienced in 2011 and 2012. Do you agree? If not, how do you explain the fall in yields since the middle of 2012? [Editorial note: Initially Ir did not receive an answer to this question. After asking a second time we received the following response from Mr. Weidmann’s representative].

From our point of view, [these questions] are a bit out of date, which is why we refrained from answering them. However, you will find Mr. Weidmann’s view on this topic in many of his earlier interviews and speeches, for instance in the speech in Paris before the Chamber of Industry and Commerce on 23 May 2013: http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Reden/2013/2013_05_23_weidmann_paris.html.

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