Jette Albinus. Foto — Ieva Salmane
Danish Major General Jette Albinus is the highest-ranking NATO commander in Latvia, and her message to Russia is clear: we will fight back with all we have, so don't even think about attacking
Since Donald Trump took office as U.S. president, his attempts to appease the Russian dictator and his often contradictory statements about NATO have raised doubts about the strength of the alliance’s security guarantees in the Baltics. But NATO is more than the rhetoric of politicians. It is the world’s most powerful military alliance, with classified yet concrete defense plans and commanders who train thousands of troops daily in preparation for the unknown hour of need.
That is precisely the case in Latvia.
Behind a tall, barbed-wire fence at the Ādaži military base sits the headquarters of NATO’s Multinational Division North. Together with the Latvian army, this unit is tasked with defending our country. Leading this command is Jette Albinus (59), a petite figure with a warm smile, yet her athletic and military record attest to her iron grip.
Jette is the first woman in the Danish Army to be awarded the rank of general. She is an experienced marathon runner, but has switched to cycling now. Before her current posting in Latvia, she participated three times in the Copenhagen–Paris velomarathon, a challenging charity ride supporting children with cancer.
In one corner of the commander's spacious office in Ādaži stands a desk with large monitors; in the other, a huge soldier's bag and a bulletproof vest. A jersey with the number One — a gift from the Canadian military — hangs on the wall. During the interview, we quite literally have the whole of Latvia before our eyes, as the conference table we’re sitting at is covered with a map of our country.
To defend Latvia in the event of war, NATO’s division will have at least five combat brigades at its disposal. Currently, it includes contributions from 19 countries. Among its key partners are the Canadian-led multinational brigade stationed in Latvia, consisting of 3,000 troops, and the Danish Army’s heavy brigade, which is based abroad. Once fully staffed, the Danish brigade will field 6,000 soldiers. Latvia’s own mechanized infantry brigade is under the operational command of the division headquarters, but in training scenarios—and should war break out—it will be reinforced by two additional brigades from the National Guard.
After speaking with Jette Albinus, we are left with no doubt: in a crisis, she will not wait for Trump’s or any other politician's word, she will defend Latvia with all the force available.
Note: This interview was originally published in Latvian by Ir magazine on July 10.
What are your main conclusions as division commander following the NATO summit in The Hague?
I think we had a lot of expectations for that meeting. As a military commander, of course you are keen to see if whatever is announced also is going to be the reality. I think it was a good outcome because nations agree on the necessity to be stronger in Europe. Of course, it would be better if we didn't have to invest that amount of money in the military, right? But that's just the way it is. So I think politicians lived up to their responsibility. The majority of them, at least, not only the countries who are neighbours to Russia and Belarus. But I also know that from that decision until I have systems in my hand, it takes time. Even though everybody's trying to speed up, and that’s another challenge — all countries have to build up at the same time. I think the biggest challenge we have is that the weapon industry cannot follow that big request for more systems.
I think the most interesting announcement was Trump saying that Putin is not going to attack NATO while he is the President of the United States. What is your take on this announcement? Does it reassure you or maybe worry more?
I think it's better he says that then the opposite. I hope this will be the case. I haven't on my military level seen any other reactions from my American colleagues. So I think hopefully it's most likely.
Since Trump returned to the office, the shadow of doubt is lingering over the US willingness to defend Europe within the NATO framework. As a military commander, do you see concrete signs of the US presence in Europe shrinking in coming years?
No, not at my level, I haven't seen anything. The few commanders that I work with so far have behaved and been as keen as they used to be.
Political decisions to double defense funding are long term — over the next ten years. From a military capability standpoint, do we really have that much time? Expert forecasts and Latvia's own defense strategy suggest that Russia could restore its military capacity within five years.
If you're asking the military, one always wants more. And even if everybody would provide the necessary money within two years, we wouldn't still be able to get the equipment because it cannot be produced. All forces in Europe have for the last 20 years scaled down. So we really have to use the coming time to see — are we good enough and what we need to change to scale up.
It requires a lot of coordination in every country, but also between countries. How can we help each other out and learn from each other? A pledge from me as a military commander: if your country is working together with other countries, you can try to buy the same equipment and try not to favour your own industry too much. I know it's easy said because every politician also wants the money to live in their own society. But it's not helping me as a military commander, if we don't procure things that can operate together. We have had a good example lately for some countries who bought the same infantry fighting vehicle. If I have four or five countries driving around in the same type of vehicle, it increases our fighting capability, reduces logistic footprint and we can help each other. So, that would be my pledge. I know there are a lot of political restraints, but they need to think about that — because the capacity has to fight.
Is this just one good example of buying the same equipment, or is this attitude really changing?
Some countries see the necessity. Of course, there can also be cases where that kind of equipment is too expensive for some, and they have to procure something else. But I think it's important that at least they take that into consideration when making decisions. It will always be a national decision, of course, but as a military commander working with a lot of nations, I think it's important we think about that.
If the funding were indeed doubled, what are the most important capabilities that we need to acquire in our specific situation next to Russia? We recently saw how Ukraine’s Spiderweb operation with cheap drones destroyed Russian strategic aviation worth seven billion dollars, so what’s the point of super-expensive military equipment?
You asked some very hard questions, I think if I could have a specific and short answer maybe I needed to be more than a major general.
I will extend my answer and say that we need to be very much aware of how technology is changing the way we fight. That's also the example you just gave, right? Cheap technology, used in an innovative way, gives new options. So it's the same when we talk about what we need and how much it costs. I think it's just as important to look into the heads of persons like me and say: you have to change your way of thinking, not just do as you have been trained 20 or 30 years ago.
That's maybe the biggest challenge, especially for my generation and above, to understand what the new technology means, how that changes the battlefield. And it goes far. So maybe we don't need to have everything on the shelf because, as soon as we have it, even if we procure it fast, it might be outdated two years later if the war then starts in six years. So maybe it's more about being skilled — having enough systems to train and exercise — and then figuring out how we can on short notice produce whatever we need.
There will be weapon systems that take longer time to produce and it's OK to procure these because this capacity will be needed anyway. But it would be crazy to go out today and buy the state of the art drones for a whole army, because in six months there's something smarter.
What we have seen in Ukraine is their ability in wartime to work closely with the industry and develop systems in the battlefield. So my answer would be we should think closely about what we for sure need.
We will need air defence systems anyway in different layers. It's probably also still good to have long range artillery and systems like that.
But then there are other systems, like the drones, and we don't need to have the full packet. Also a lot of autonomous systems on the ground that are developing very fast. Here we should procure something to do experimentation, to learn how to utilise it. And to have the capacity to say to a company producing tractors or cars — we make an agreement with you, should a crisis of war occur, you have to change your direction and scale it up. So it's also a different way of procuring, because I think we can easily spend all this money and end up having something that may not be usable in the future.
Russia is stepping up its attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure — we are dealing with a ruthless and illegal warmonger. Should our defense plans be reviewed again, taking into account Russia's real way of war?
I think Russians fight in the same way as always. They never respected human rights, they never even looked at their own soldiers as a valid resource, like we do. They never thought about human beings. My conclusion is we shouldn't expect them to do so. We have to be able to mitigate or reduce that risk to the extent we can.
But you will never get me to say that we also have to disrespect the rule of law. Never. We just have to be smarter. We have to take care of the civilian population to the maximum extent. If we know they will bomb civilian areas, we must try to evacuate the people in time. Make sure they cannot capture kids. But we should behave like humans and not let ourselves fall into that trap.
Oh, I'm not suggesting that. I'm worried if we are ready for such a war. Because before Ukraine there was perception that the war in the 21st century is going to be different. But we see now, it's like a Second World War or even First World War all over. So my question, is NATO really prepared for such a ruthless way of war?
Can you prepare yourself for that? I've been in the force for 38 years. I've been on international missions several times. But I've never been in a fight of existential war like we are seeing now. I don't think any of us can imagine it. Can you prepare yourself mentally? I think it's very hard, because it will affect everybody. So we as military planners have to protect the civilian population as much as we can, be prepared and try to reduce the effect of war. But if you have this kind of war, it will always be terrible and brutal. So we should do as much as we can to avoid it.
We saw what happened last year when a Russian combat drone carrying 16 kg of explosives flew into Latvia. Our armed forces were unable to do anything, but fortunately it crashed in a field. If Riga were to experience a drone attack like the ones we are seeing every night in Ukraine, what could our and NATO forces do?
If I should answer that, I might overstep what I can say due to security. But I think in the current position with the systems we have, we would not be able to do the same thing as we see in Kyiv.
You have to remember that many NATO systems have been deployed there. If we have to do the same, we will have to deploy more than we have today. But since the threat is not here, we don't have the same amount of systems in place.
I also think we have to be realistic. It's very, very difficult to protect a country against drones. You see Russia and Ukraine developing the tactics all the time. Now they try to make drones in swarms so it overwhelms systems. So we have to be realistic about what we can protect and what we can not. And if we can't protect, we must ask — what do we do then? If you look at your borders and how huge your country is, it's important to communicate to the population that we have to be realistic. Not that we will not defend, but what we actually can protect if we were up against what we see in Kyiv right now. So what do we do then? Well, my best answer — do our utmost to make sure we don't get into that situation. And also we have to stop that capacity further back [in Russia].
Could you explain in simple terms for the public — what would be your role as a commander of Multinational Division North Headquarters in the case if Russia attacks Latvia?
I have to fulfil my task in wartime, but it is even more important what I'm building up and what I'm capable of doing now. I will do my utmost together with all the nations here and the Latvian armed forces, to avoid getting into the war. And it actually means building up everything, so we are sure we can defend. To the extent we know how Russia behaves, we need to make sure we do as much as we can now, so they don’t even think about it. Or at least think twice before they make a decision.
If you ask me, we will keep building our forces, as strong as necessary. We will be ready to fight. We will exercise our fight and we definitely have the willingness to fight.
I've said it publicly in Denmark, because I'm sometimes asked — do you think NATO will declare Article 5?And I've said — I don't care. If Latvia is being attacked, I will employ my forces and then they can put me into jail afterwards.
It's important we show that we are willing and capable to defend this country. With whatever we have at any given time. I think that's the most important thing we need to do, and hopefully then we can prevent the enemy from even thinking about it. Because that's the only thing they understand. They don't believe in words. They believe in action and willingness. And here, if we have to defend Latvia, it is a task for the whole society. For all the institutions, for all the population. That’s the approach we need to have. I really think it's so important that we keep building up and actually show that we are here, and we will fight no matter what.
Military experts and also some politicians are now talking about the possibility that maybe Russia could make a provocative attack on the Baltic states or Poland. Not to occupy, but just to kill NATO. To show that NATO is not real, if some member states will not react. So as a military commander, how likely do you think this scenario is, and how prepared are we for this provocative sting?
Here in Latvia together with joint headquarters, I think we are prepared for that. That's also what we are working together on. Also, I don't spend so much time wondering whether they would do it or not. I try to spend time to prepare myself for the worst case.
Sometimes you can be overwhelmed and think, oh, there are so many things you need to do. How I deal with it as a commander and as a sports person, is step by step.
When you put yourself up for a marathon, it is overwhelming, but you take it step by step. What can I do today? Tomorrow? In a month? I can keep improving. That's also what I say to my staff and commanders. You know, they want to have everything and want to be ready. It's great and that's where we need to go. But we must not end up in frustration. We must instead keep asking ourselves at all levels — what can we do right now? How can we move forward and be pleased with every step that brings us to the end state? I'm realistic. We don't know how the enemy will react, so we have to prepare for the worst case. And that's what we do. And then we have to show that we are willing and capable of reacting. I think that's the only thing we can do.
Last year, a Polish general said that if Russia invades Lithuania by even a centimeter, the response will be immediate: “We will bomb all strategic targets within a 300 km radius,” including St. Petersburg, and “an attack on Poland or the Baltic states will mean the end of Russia.” What is your response — what will happen if Russia invades Laeven a centimeter of Latvian territory?
I think it's more or less the same. But we also have to realise that there will be warnings. There will be signs due to the NATO framework. We won’t be standing there unprepared. So again, I think we should utilise that, try to say — this is a bad idea because if you do so, you will be up against a whole NATO. So it wouldn't happen out of the blue, I'm convinced. And I'm also convinced that we would stand together. I'm not saying it would be the end of Russia, but I'm sure that NATO is more willing and more realistic than it has been for many years. Because we have seen what they [Russia] are willing to do in Ukraine. On the other hand, Russia haven't been able to conquer Ukraine. So we should not underestimate them, but we also should not overestimate their capability.
How are NATO allies preparing for the Russian exercise Zapad this fall?
I think all NATO and many surrounding countries are prepared for Zapad. It hasn't taken place for some years. I think we are prepared. On the other hand, there's a lot of things going on. So I also have tasked my staff — it's good to focus on that, but sometimes the enemy could use that to do something else. So I keep saying, well, as far as we know, it's not that big. But we have to be aware that we don't get tunnel vision.
Based on intelligence, how many troops have the Russians pulled into Belarus and Russia’s western border area at the moment?
I will not share the details, but I think the numbers are absolutely doable. It's very similar to what you can read in open sources.
What do you currently see as the main military threat to Latvia? Maybe Zapad could turn into some provocation?
I don't think it would, because as long as they're engaged in Ukraine it would be unrealistic to open what we call another front. They wouldn't gain anything from that. I think the first precondition for something to occur, is some kind of ceasefire in Ukraine. And we still have to see them reorganising and regrouping. And then we act accordingly, of course.
How closely are you following the Ukrainian front, and how do you see the war ending?
I won't get on the latter, because a lot comes back to the support. I can’t guess for how long that will continue. We are following it closely. The intelligence community here is following it, NATO is following it. I'm also still participating in my national updates [in Denmark], where our own intelligence is giving an in-depth brief about what's going on. We follow it closely based on two things — how is the war going, and what can we learn?
There is a feeling that politicians and the military are afraid of Putin's nuclear threat. There are basically two camps: one sees a bluff and others are afraid. How do you see it?
If we think about the nuclear threat, I'm pleased that it's way above [my] tactical level to discuss these dilemmas. But I hope that no matter which country you are from, you won't use that system because it's hard to see how it ends. My rational side says that we also need to be careful that we don't put Putin in a situation where the only solution is to use that. But don't ask me how we are going to avoid that. I simply don't know. I think it's very political, very strategic.
But you are not afraid?
Not currently.
You’ve been in Latvia for two years. How have the resilience and readiness of our armed forces, politicians, and society changed?
I think they're doing whatever they can. They are, of course, very willing and very keen to strengthen what they can.
But you are also a large country with a small population. You are challenged by your finances. So it's a matter of us together. That’s the approach I have taken. Because we are in it together.
If you come back to when I started, I didn't feel so much we. Both have to want that. I'm not able to judge previously, but I felt I really needed to put a lot of effort in earning my military colleagues' trust, and also the trust of the society. So that's one thing I identified as a personal goal very early on, and within the first year we took some very important steps. The last step we took at the end of last year. After you had updated your National Defence plan, I said — well, I will integrate the forces I have on the ground with your plan, and we will figure out how we can do this together. Hopefully that was the proof — if there was any doubt left — whether NATO here would react or not. Now with Canada's framework nation and a lot of other countries' contributions we have a forward land forces brigade here, multinational. In summer 2024, Denmark also trained and affiliated the first Danish heavy Brigade. When it's fully developed, it is as strong as two current brigades together. We also see signs that Sweden might consider training a brigade. As we stand together, we are becoming stronger and stronger.
Sweden joined our multinational brigade in February. What is their main contribution and how does it affect our overall capabilities?
It is a strong battlegroup. The good thing about the Swedish and Danish battlegroup is that it doesn't struggle with the kind of interoperability issues as the multinational group does. Because it's one nation, right? The same system, language, everything. So we actually have a lot of combat power here.
Also, both Denmark and Sweden are all neighbouring countries to the Baltic Sea. For us, it's also a part of our National Defence, that also brings validity to it. And then finally the way we operate together in the Nordic countries — the thinking, the behaviour — it's very similar here in Latvia.
Looking at the bigger picture, how have our defense plans changed since Sweden and Finland joined NATO?
If you look around the Baltic Sea, of course, that puts a lot more pressure on Russia and Putin, because, except for Kaliningrad, it's all NATO countries. As a NATO, but also in this part of the region, we stand much stronger.
We also have to remember that Finland has one of the strongest armies of all. So having them contribute to NATO is great. Also bringing in the Swedish capabilities and not having to think, oh, they might be neutral. So we stand much stronger. Coming back to the signal to Putin, he must be the one who's getting sweat on his forehead, not us. We are in a much better position.
What is the weakest link when it comes to the security and defence capabilities of the Baltic states?
Air defence and ability to hit the Russians on the other side of the border.
That's the weakest link?
I don't know if it's the weakest, I think it's the most important capacity to build up further, air defence. But again, if you have to hit somebody far away, you have to be able to detect them. So there's a lot of capabilities linked together. But what we need here to defend the Baltics is the same as Ukraine has been asking NATO to provide for the last three years. So you can just look at the list — we need the same.
And how far we are from what you would say, this is OK?
You'll never get a military person to say so. But I would fight with whatever I have, the more I have, the better.
Are you always ready?
I have to be. Even though it's a shitty situation, right? But if the Russians think we won't do anything because we don't have everything, they're wrong. We will hit them as much as we can with what we have. We will make it as difficult for them as possible, winning the time, so the rest of NATO can be here.
Like that lady in Kyiv who hit the drone with a jar of tomatoes?
Yeah.
What is your daily routine here in Ādaži, and how do you divide your time between your other headquarters in Denmark?
I'm here most of the time. When I'm in Denmark, it's normally on the weekend to see my family, they still live in Copenhagen. When I’m in Denmark, I also try, from time to time, to be in Slagelse headquarters on Mondays or Fridays.
But I spend the majority of my time here and so do the majority of the staff. It’s important to know the terrain and people, establish contact and relationships.
When I'm in the headquarters, they're very good at putting a lot of stuff in my calendar. It's everything from going out to have conversation with my primary units on the ground, participating in the exercises. I also have a lot of visitors because I have 19 countries that contribute. And of course, even though I'm a tactical commander, I also have to be strategic. Trying to persuade countries to work together, bring in more forces and develop plans.
How has your cooperation developed with the new commander of Latvian National Armed Forces, Kaspars Pudāns? He is the first person in this position who has no experience in the Soviet army, what’s your take on that?
I had a marvelous cooperation also with the previous commander [Kalniņš] — if I needed to talk to him, he always took his time, the same as Pudāns. They are both very open, it's very easy. And it goes also for the rest of the generals in the Latvian armed forces. I never felt any hesitations.
Your CV usually mentions that you are the first woman to attain the rank of general in Denmark. How did you manage that? How many female generals are in the Danish army now?
Two as we speak. There have been two before me. They were brigade generals, one star. But in Denmark, the one star is not a permanent position. So in Denmark we say, you have to be a two star to become a real General.
It's never been my goal, right? I was a young sports girl and I liked being challenged. For many years I said — well, if I just become a major… My family still throws that in my face sometimes. It also has a lot to do with circumstances to get to that point. All the time I just concentrate on trying to do a good job. If you're in a place where you feel that you can do stuff, you normally produce the best. So one thing just led to another.
If we look back at how long we actually had female soldiers in the Danish armed forces, there's nothing to brag about. We should have had one or two stars before, if you ask me. But it’s hard… And I don't think there has been a policy where they did not want to. For many years it has been open for everybody, no matter if you're tall or small or what kind of religion you have. But it's hard to change a culture that is more than 150 years old. And we still raise our kids to have a certain behaviour depending on whether you are female or male.
I think we have been too slow to make sure that the environment was attractive for people with other backgrounds. Because there is a soldier’s prototype — you have to be tall and strong and able to run. Coming back to what we talked about, I think the skill set of soldiers is much more varied than it used to be. I don't need a guy to run 10 kilometres in 40 minutes if he's going to be the drone controller. I need smart and brainy people that can teach an old commander like me how I can use Artificial Intelligence. So I think the variation of soldiers is much wider today, but we are still very stuck. I've also seen it here in Latvia. You have actually quite a lot of female soldiers, but why do you put them primarily in the administration positions?
Denmark is now introducing mandatory service for female conscripts. What do you think about that? How is it perceived in Denmark?
I've been quite vocal about it. Coming back to my point, I don't think we can afford today to exclude 50% of the population. It has nothing to do with your sex, whether you're a good soldier. It comes back to what functions you have to fulfill. We have positions for everybody and we should be much better in communicating that, because we need all kinds of people with all kinds of skill-sets today in the armed forces.
And if we say we want to force people in the armed forces, we need to force all. We should also have females. In Denmark we've had quite a number of volunteer conscription so far. So by offering it to the female, in the end we would have to force fewer people in, because more can be volunteered, right? That’s up to the army to make sure it's actually attractive.
Why did you join the army?
I was always curious. And I was a sports girl back then, pretty good at soccer. My history teacher in the gymnasium said — you can do all the sports you want in the army. And I said OK, I'll just try it and then go to University. In Denmark I can start educating myself by becoming an officer of reserve. That was two years back in the late 80s. It was very popular because you get some extra payment. So I said, let's just take that adventure. And then I figured out I liked it. And my commander said: I think you need to stay.
There is a good story I've told to the Danish newspapers before. When I first came home to my parents and told them I want to join the Army, my father said I'm stupid. He hated his time as a conscript, but it was many years ago. My mom didn't say anything. Then when I came back after two years and told them I'm continuing, I want to be a professional, my mom went into her room and took out an envelope. She gave it to me. It read «This is just Jette». She had written that already two years ago. She just knew me.
When did you join?
1988. Just before the end of the Cold War. My first mission was in Bosnia. And I thought, OK, now it makes sense what I've been doing. I'm trying to make sure that different parties that have been fighting don't fight anymore. It was more or less with all the international missions.
And then in 2022 this happened [Russia’s full scale war in Ukraine]. I was just — shit, no, we are not going back. Even though I've been deployed in Afghanistan, looking back at my service, I will always remember that day when we saw this war coming. I was working in the Danish defence command. In the Operation staff we knew already in October or November that it was not a matter of “if” they were to attack, but “when”.
End of 2021?
Yes. In December, just after Christmas, my commander — he's now the chief of the Danish Defence — said to me: Jette, you need to go home, pack your stuff, travel to the city and establish operational headquarter. And you have probably five weeks before Russians are going to attack. I looked at him and said: OK, that’s what took Norway 13 years, sir, and you're asking me to do it in five weeks? [He said:] Yes!
Which city was that?
It was in Jutland. The headquarter was in Copenhagen and we needed an operational headquarter in another part of the country. And back then none of us knew whether they would only attack Ukraine or more. Very few people at that time knew that, right? I couldn’t even tell my family. So I went home. I went upstairs. Packed my stuff. My family asked: «Are you going to exercise?» No, I'm going to build a joint headquarters. «OK, based on the situation?» Yes. «OK, see you on the weekend.» No, I don't know when I'll be back. «Is it that serious?» And I said, yes. «Do I need to go shopping?» Yeah, maybe not tonight, but it’s a good idea.
And then I had to travel to that city and build up the headquarters in five weeks. And at that point I didn't know whether my own country was going to be attacked. I couldn't say anything to my family. And I actually felt very different from being deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq — even though I could lose my life there — , because this is my own country. So I can relate how it is to have a threat close to your own country like it is here. It's much different, right? It's something more existential.
The last two days before the attack, I was sleeping with my trousers on. And at 5 am when it happened, the commander called me and said — now you have to go into the bunker. For 24 hours we monitored the situation, we briefed the military decision makers and politicians, because we didn't know whether Denmark was going to be attacked. And we spent those five weeks building the headquarter, trying to get our ships back from the Red Sea where they were hunting pirates. We bought ammunition. Probably we did the same as many other countries. And that was for me so different, because suddenly it was my own country, my own family, that was threatened. And going back to that Cold War, I think it’s a step back for the world, for all of us.
Do you have an answer why we have it now? What happened? All those millions died back then, and there was that sense that nobody would want it happen again?
We didn't think we would end up there. I don't know why we end up having decision makers in different countries that are dictators or want to conquer the world. But that's basically what it is. People with too much power who want to expand their empire.
What can we do about it?
I don't know. But we have now more wars going on in the world than we've ever had since the Second World War. It's here [in Europe]. It's in Israel. It's a lot of crazy things.
But we can't let them win.
No!